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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 March 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gerald Shannon (Canada)

The President: I declare open the 647th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Brazil, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Amorim.

Mr. AMORIM (Brazil): It is a pleasure for me to address this plenary under your able presidency, the distinguished Ambassador of Canada, my good friend Gerald Shannon. As myself, you have the dubious honour of occupying yourself with every issue in town. I am sure, however, that in your case, unlike mine, your negotiating skills will come as a help to this body and contribute to make true the biblical saying of "transforming swords into ploughshares". So I warmly congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. You can count on my support and that of my delegation in your endeavours as President of the Conference on Disarmament.

Let me also put on record my appreciation with regard to your predecessor, Mr. Radoslav Deyanov, of Bulgaria, who presided the Conference during a period of particular interest, when two important reports for the future of the CD were presented to the resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly.

My intention today is to refer to the question of "Transparency in armaments" and I note also with satisfaction that even before we got transparent in armaments, we are already transparent in subjects, and we are somehow pre-announcing what we are going to discuss here. I think that is an improvement.

In 1991 the Conference on Disarmament was called upon, by United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, to address a number of issues related to transparency in armaments. The absence of an ad hoc committee during the 1992 session did not prevent us from dealing with the general aspects of the subject, under the coordination and guidance of Ambassador Mounir Zahran, of Egypt. We reported to the General Assembly about our first discussions, which may not have progressed as fast as we wished, because of the priority accorded last year to the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention.

We were encouraged to see the early establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments this year and that the attention of member States is rapidly turning to concrete issues, under the able chairmanship of the Ambassador of Egypt. One of the concrete issues the Committee can take up was already referred to in our last plenary by Ambassador Lanús of Argentina. The question was mentioned in paragraph 13 of resolution 46/36 L, which requested the Conference on Disarmament to elaborate practical means to increase openness and transparency in relation to the transfer of high technology with military applications and weapons of mass destruction. We agree with the concepts enunciated by Ambassador Lanús that technology in itself is neutral, that there is a right of access to high technologies which are necessary for socio-economic development and that international transfers in this field have to be conducted under well-defined, multilaterally agreed rules. I note with satisfaction that

mention of this important question was made in the report of the CD to the resumed session of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

The view of my Government is that transparency in relation to the transfer of high technology cannot be achieved through unilateral controls. An effort should be made in order to allow a wide participation of countries in the elaboration of rules governing transfers and controls of dual-use technology. Participation in the decision-making process related to the verification regimes established by multilateral rules is also of utmost importance.

Resolution 47/52 L calls upon Member States to provide the requested data on imports and exports of arms to the Secretary-General annually, beginning in 1993. I am pleased to inform that my Government is compiling data and will take the necessary steps to comply with the request before the deadline of 30 April. In this connection I would like to express my Government's support for the proposal made by the United States Ambassador at the plenary session of 4 March. We agree to the commitment proposed by him with regard to the timely provision of information to the United Nations Secretariat, as requested in resolution 47/52 L. We can also support the suggestion of exchange of information among Member States, as an exercise of a voluntary character. All data exchanged have to be properly transmitted to the United Nations Secretariat too, where it will be made available for consultation by Member States, in accordance with resolution 46/36 L.

My Government intends to continue its cooperation with the United Nations Secretariat in providing all relevant information to increase transparency in the area of arms transfers. In July 1992, information related to the Brazilian controls of materials of military application was transmitted to the Secretariat. The Secretariat was also informed that since 1936 formal controls were established in Brazil on production, trade, industrial use, transit, import and export of military and what we now call dual-use material. Information was also provided on the development of national regulations over the years, together with a description of our "General guidelines for the national policy on export of military-use material".

My Government welcomed with appreciation the approval by consensus of the report of governmental experts on the Register of Conventional Arms, whose work was concluded in July 1992, under the able guidance of Ambassador Wagenmakers, of the Netherlands, to whom I want to pay special tribute. Mr. Antonino Lisboa, of Brazil, took an active part in the expert group. We were glad to see that the Secretary-General made full use of the experts' conclusions in presenting his report on the technical procedures and adjustments to the annex of resolution 46/36 L and that the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the recommendations made by the Secretary-General.

In 1993 and 1994 we will face new challenges in assessing the operation of the United Nations Register and considering ways to develop it further. We agree with the Secretary-General that successful development and operation of the Register could in the final analysis provide the United Nations with an effective instrument in preventive diplomacy.

(Mr. Amorim, Brazil)

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Amorim of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Mr. President, since I am taking the floor for the first time at the present plenary meeting, allow me to congratulate you on taking up the presidency.

During the past year, major efforts have been made to accelerate disarmament and détente throughout the world. The spread of ethnic and religious disputes in various parts of the world, however, is causing great concern in the international community. Under the pretext of dispute settlement, all kinds of additional weapons are being introduced into these areas and intervention by various forces is on the increase. Mass sales of modern weapons, including the latest fighters, to a variety of countries and regions are further heightening tension in regions of potential conflict. The evolution of the present situation shows that there is no change in the power politics and the world strategy in the cold war era, even in the new situation where the structure of the cold war has been dismantled and the very East-West concept has lost its meaning.

Power politics has halted the process of détente and worsened tension on the Korean peninsula. Last year, the high-level North-South talks reached an advanced stage. The "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South" and the "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula", having been agreed upon and put into force, passed to the implementation stage. These agreements of historic scope opened up a broad path to concord, détente and reunification. The fact that the United States had barely to take measures for a year, which were conducive to détente on the Korean peninsula before North-South rapprochement made historic headway proves that stability and peace on the Korean peninsula depend on the United States. The sudden decision taken last October to resume the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises once again heightened tension. My delegation would like to draw your particular attention to the fact that the Prime Ministers of both the North and the South of Korea agreed at Pyongyang at the end of September to related conventions for the implementation of the agreement and that less than a month later, in other words in October, the resumption of "Team Spirit" was decided upon. Two hundred thousand troops, nuclear weapons and the latest combat equipment of every kind were mobilized in these war manoeuvres. Previously, they used the containment of the Soviet Union as a pretext. But it no longer exists. What is more, the United States and the South Korean authorities had officially announced last year that they were taking measures to end these exercises so as to promote détente in the Korean peninsula and progress in the North-South dialogue. It is absolutely unjustifiable to resume the "Team Spirit" which had been broken off, at a time when dialogue and relations between North and South were improving, particularly when they were proclaiming non-aggression and the nuclear inspection was taking place. In such a situation, who dares to say that it was time to resume the "Team Spirit" and

that the mobilization of large numbers of troops was not intended to attack solely the People's Democratic Republic of Korea? It should be noted that they constitute the most extensive nuclear exercises in the world at the present time when the cold war is over. They run wholly counter to the ideals and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, designed to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty and refrain from making use of the nuclear threat.

Dialogue is incompatible with war exercises against the partner across the table. It is well known that in the past, whenever the "Team Spirit" was happening in South Korea, the situation was exacerbated to the utmost, dialogue and contacts were suspended for some time or were in a total stalemate. It was for this very reason that from the beginning of the high-level North-South negotiations we said we were in favour of non-aggression and repeated our request for an end to the "Team Spirit" against us as negotiating partner. Through the resumption of the "Team Spirit" it became apparent that the United States and the South Korean authorities did not want either dialogue or reunification or détente on the Korean peninsula and that they were merely pursuing their strategic aim in order to stifle and crush our Republic. The real American intention was confirmed yet again, and the security of our country once again fell under severe threat. The super-Power has not only forcibly carried out the unjustifiable "Team Spirit" under cover of the so-called nuclear issue in the North, but also got IAEA to adopt an extraordinary resolution which imposes a "special inspection" on us, thus creating a dangerous situation which jeopardizes the sovereignty of our Republic.

What is the true nature of the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula? The nuclear weapons that the United States had begun to deploy in 1957 in South Korea numbered about 1,000 in the 1970s, and they have been constantly updated and strengthened. Whether or not to remove the nuclear threat is for our nation a question of life or death. Our accession to the NPT was also designed first and foremost to promote the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea and the elimination of the nuclear menace. As soon as we acceded to the NPT, my Government redoubled its efforts to bring about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In June 1986, it put forward specific proposals for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone of peace. However, the United States and South Korea stubbornly opposed this, a historical fact noted in the records of the fourth conference of parties held to review the NPT. Although the announcement in 1991 of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea gave rise to a number of doubts, we perceived it as a sign favourable to détente on the Korean peninsula.

After a lengthy period of projects and refusals, the North and the South of Korea finally agreed on the "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula", a document of historic importance. In accordance with the aforementioned Declaration, they set up a Joint Nuclear Control Commission that held 14 sessions up to last January. There was some progress, but also divergences of view. The nub of the difference related to the definition of the sites for inspection and the inspection arrangements, with our side wanting to

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proceed to a general inspection on the American bases and nuclear weapons in South Korea and the latter advocating "mutual inspection on the same number of sites". The work of the Joint North-South Nuclear Control Commission shows that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Korea is impossible as long as there is no fundamental change in the nuclear policy of the super-Power vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula.

In April last year my Government concluded the safeguards agreement and, from May to February this year, accepted ad hoc IAEA inspections on six occasions. We made every sincere effort at cooperation so that the Agency inspection could be carried out successfully. During the inspection that was conducted without a hitch, it was confirmed that our nuclear activities have been carried out for peaceful purposes. But at the end of last year, IAEA suddenly began to exert pressure on us with two problems. It claimed that there was an "inconsistency in principle" and that it wanted to inspect two "military sites". There is in fact no "inconsistency in principle" between our country and the Agency. There is no disagreement between our initial report and the results of the Agency inspection, but a difference in the method used for measurement, interpretation and evaluation between our facility operators and the team of inspectors.

During the sixth ad hoc inspection at the beginning of February, the inspectors recognized the cause of this difference and thus threw further light on this question, and agreement was reached for the results of the inspection carried out by the Agency to be re-examined so that discussions could continue on this topic during the next inspection. It is more than obvious that this cannot be a pretext for a forced inspection, but means that consultations must continue. This is why some Agency officials have obstructed the normal running of the inspection and negotiations to settle the difference and have been quick to take a decision on the special inspection, standing resolutely by their inspection results. The sixth team of inspectors was due to arrive in Vienna on 8 February and again calculate the difference, so as to communicate it to us. But on 9 February, the day after his team arrived, the Director General proposed a "special inspection", even before the new calculation had been carried out. In this way the "promise" to inform us of the outcome of the new calculation was replaced by the resolution on a "special inspection". That is why the way was barred to resolving the problem by negotiations. Even in this situation, we continued our efforts to resolve the issue. Our Minister of Atomic Energy came to Vienna with facility operators for talks to throw light on the difference on 20 and 21 February just before the session of the Board of Governors.

As for the allegations made by some people in the Agency, we again gave scientific and technical explanations based on real evidence. None the less, although our partners recognized their error of principle in their measurements and could give no response to our argument, they ended up by torpedoing the negotiations while going so far as to say that they had not seen our brief which they had already seen during their inspection. It is because the United States' need to obtain, before 8 March, the starting date of the "Team Spirit", the

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decision on the special inspection, so as to justify the resumption of these exercises, was closely linked to the interests of the Agency, which, to the detriment of a small country, in other words, our own, is seeking to curry favour with the United States (which was criticizing IAEA by describing its nuclear inspection as lacking credibility). In fact, the decision of the Board of Governors on 25 February was sufficient to allow the resumption of the "Team Spirit" exercises, which the international community criticized for lacking clear justification.

As for the two military sites, these are conventional military bases that have nothing to do with the nuclear issue. They are not therefore to be inspected and we are under no obligation to open them. There is no scientific or legal relationship between the "inconsistency" and the two military sites. At present the United States and some individuals in the IAEA secretariat, by describing these two military sites as nuclear facilities, are spreading rumours to the effect that the two sites are nuclear facilities and that we are refusing to open them to inspection. We have never refused a request from officials of the Agency to visit the nuclear sites. But the problem lies in the military sites, which are not nuclear facilities, and which the Agency wishes to inspect so as to confirm a hypothesis that has been based on falsified information provided by third countries, among them a country that is belligerent towards us. It is with a very dangerous objective that the United States and some individuals in the Agency secretariat have most carefully set up this question of the two military sites.

On 23 July last year, the United States invited the Director General of the Agency to a joint hearing in the House of Representatives so as to find out about our nuclear programme. At the same time, they asked him to impose upon us a "special inspection" and a "challenge inspection". In September 1992, two months later, the Director General of the agency suddenly asked us to show, in the context of a visit, the "two sites", which have nothing to do with our nuclear activities, to the inspectors that had come to our country for their third ad hoc inspection. We showed them these, respecting his first proposal, although this request to allow them to visit any site and any facility which are not the subject of the guarantees runs counter to the spirit of the convention. The inspectors went through them with inspection equipment, like a police raid on the home of a criminal. When, two days later, they again asked to be shown them once more, "so that other people in the Agency should not find it necessary to visit them again", we also authorized the visits. Only then did we get the disagreeable impression, on noting that some individuals in IAEA were carrying out a second-rate operation, that under cover of the visit, the "challenge inspection" had already happened and that the sovereignty of our country had been violated. But they had to acknowledge that these conventional military sites had nothing to do with nuclear activities. In relation to the fact that some individuals in the Agency were taking advantage of our good will, we sent the Director General an official letter stating that henceforward, no visit or inspection of this kind would be authorized without proper grounds and that this

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was the first and last chance. Everything that has happened since then has confirmed that the Agency was allowing itself to be manipulated by a third party.

On 22 December last year the Director General once again suggested a visit to a military site that had already been visited, and another military site. During negotiations that the IAEA consultation delegation held with us from 20 to 22 January in Pyongyang, it did not disguise the need for its inspection on "two sites" on the basis of information supplied by the super-Power, and sought to threaten us with pressures while emphasizing the "urgency" and "importance" of this inspection. Today it is clear that the "importance" and "urgency" meant political pressure by the Board of Governors' decision of 25 February and the military threat by the "Team Spirit" that were to begin on 8 March.

The use of information provided by third countries in nuclear inspection is not set forth in the safeguards agreement, the Statute of IAEA or other documents adopted by the Board of Governors, and in particular it was rejected by many members during the December 1991 session of the Board of Governors. If, in the inspection, information is used that has been supplied by third countries, the specific nature of the prevailing system of Agency inspections will change, and the structure and content of the standard safeguards agreement, which constitutes its legal basis, will also have to change completely.

If our country accepted the improper request for inspection by IAEA over conventional military bases, based on information invented by the super-Power, this would mean legitimizing the act of espionage by the United States which is the belligerent adversary of our country and marking the start of the complete opening of all our military bases. In this case, this will create a serious precedent such that my country today, other non-nuclear countries tomorrow, will fall victim to it. It goes without saying that the nuclear inspections by IAEA in our country to date have been carried out under the manipulation of a third party and not in accordance with the Agency's Statute or the safeguards agreement. Contrary to the safeguards agreement, the Agency has systematically provided the United States and South Korea with the results of the inspections with regard to my country. Ultimately, this shows that those who are hostile to us have made use of our sincerity for the inspection in order to undermine the interior of the country and jeopardize our sovereignty and dignity.

My Government's accession to the NPT and the entry into force of the safeguards agreement were designed to remove the nuclear threat against us, and not to place its sovereignty and security at the mercy of anyone. Indeed, it was not in order to allow ourselves to be intimidated by nuclear weapons nor by sanctions or pressures from the United States or any associated forces. All these facts show that the greater our efforts to bring about détente and national union and thus promote the maintenance of peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, and the more our peaceful nuclear policy is confirmed through nuclear inspections, the more our Republic has to face a greater danger. There is no country or people which will remain impassive in the face of an obvious strategic attempt to stifle and crush a country by force of arms and political

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pressure and the seriousness of the situation deriving from this, in which the fate of the nation is threatened. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was forced to take a step to withdraw from the NPT so as to defend its supreme interests.

The United States and some individuals in IAEA who are tagging along behind it are wholly responsible for having made us unable to continue to meet our obligations under the NPT. The end of the "Team Spirit" military exercises for this year does not weaken the nuclear, military and political threat hanging over us, but on the contrary, it is growing more than ever in a new form. At present, attempts are proving increasingly open to bring our matter to the United Nations Security Council, forcing us to reverse our decision to withdraw from the NPT, so as to bring new pressure and heavier threats to bear on us. If the United States, which has directly used force to ruin our Republic and has not let up the pressure, the blockade and the sanctions for a single moment, continues to pursue nothing but power politics in the future, the hostile relations between the DPRK and the United States will by no means improve. Today, to use "isolation" or a "sanction" to intimidate our people, which considers dignity and independence as something vital, is a path without knowing exactly our people. If the United States and their satellites apply ever greater threats against the sovereignty of our Republic and the security of the nation, we will be placed in a position where we cannot but take appropriate measures in response.

It was the United States that first produced nuclear weapons to bring about the nuclear arms race, to use them to sow nuclear horror around the world, and that seeks to deploy them even into the universe. It is also the United States that none the less escapes the called-for condemnation. The international community must never allow a single super-Power the privilege which will allow it to produce, upgrade, sell or deploy on foreign soil weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles. All this constitutes the source of all the evil in our world. There is a moral code in the international community characterized by justice and impartiality. It is absolutely not right or equitable to remain silent about the fact that the super-Power and some individuals in IAEA have secured the adoption of an unjust unprecedented resolution, and to call into question only legitimate counter-measures that a small country without nuclear weapons has rightly taken to safeguard its right to exist.

The policy of the Government of our Republic involving the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes is unchanging. In the future too the Government and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will make every effort to carry through their proposals for denuclearization and disarmament in the Korean peninsula and for the reunification of the country, the guarantee of lasting peace and security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for his compliments to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, as this is the first time that my delegation takes the floor in the plenary meeting under your presidency, let me, at the outset, join the delegations which have already taken the floor in congratulating you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and assuring you of our full cooperation.

Japan had already joined the other members of the Western Group in the statement made on 18 March by the group coordinator, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands. Today I have taken the floor to put on record a concern of Japan, a country situated in the close vicinity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the recent development in our region. The announcement of 12 March by the DPRK about its withdrawal from the NPT constitutes a challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself and brings about a grave situation as was stated by many delegations at the last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 18 March. The international community has continuously been making concerted efforts to strengthen the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The action recently taken by the DPRK fundamentally goes counter to such international endeavours. Therefore, Japan profoundly deplores the DPRK's decision.

The DPRK accuses in its announcement the secretariat of IAEA. The Board of Governors of IAEA, however, adopted by consensus on 18 March a resolution which supports the Director General and the secretariat of IAEA. Thus no country shared the view expressed by the DPRK. The DPRK has not cleared the doubt about its nuclear ambitions. With respect to the special inspection, it was natural that the secretariat of IAEA took the relevant measures, in view of the significant inconsistencies between the information provided by the DPRK and the findings by IAEA, which had become apparent as a result of the past six ad hoc inspections.

The DPRK's unilateral action has changed the situation in the Korean peninsula, which may seriously affect the peace and security of Japan. And Japan is deeply concerned about this. In collaboration with the United Nations Security Council, IAEA and such countries concerned as the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Japan intends to continue to urge the DPRK to reverse its decision of withdrawal from the NPT and thus to return to the international community so that it will take part in the international concerted efforts for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We should like to remind the DPRK that, as the country remains a State party to the NPT until its withdrawal becomes effective, it shall remain under the obligations of the NPT as well as those of the safeguards agreement with IAEA.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank Ambassador Tanaka for his statement and for his kind words expressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. The representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar, has asked for the floor.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): The United States regrets to note the many outright distortions and misstatements of fact in today's address by the representative of the DPRK. The true facts are well known and are a matter of record. What we heard today from the representative of the DPRK, when boiled down to its essentials, simply says that rather than abide by its commitments and international obligations, rather than open Yongbyon and the other facility to the required international inspection, the DPRK would prefer to abrogate the Treaty and walk away from it, throwing a bunch of shabby distortions at us as an excuse. I think that the intelligence of the representatives here and of their authorities has been insulted.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I have already had occasion last week to express my views as a national representative on the announcement by the authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty. My country's position is also contained in the statement made by the Danish presidency of the European Community on behalf of the 12 member States, and also in the statement read in this room last week by the Ambassador of the Netherlands on behalf of the Western Group. Consequently it was not my intention to revert to this subject. However, I cannot allow to go unanswered the words which were just spoken by the representative of North Korea. Much could be said about many points; I will address only one. It is not acceptable to my delegation to say or imply that the present situation is due to one super-Power and a few individuals in the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have already heard similar arguments in the recent past from another State in another region of the world, we know what they are worth, as well as why they are being made. It is not a single country, even a super-Power, that is at the origin of the decision of IAEA, which is gravely concerned at the situation created by North Korea. It is the international community, represented in this case by the Board of Governors of IAEA, which on 25 February last, after having heard a more than convincing report from its Director General, requested North Korea to respect its international commitments by allowing Agency inspection teams - international, neutral teams - to visit two problematical sites. That decision, I hardly need recall, was adopted by consensus by the Board of Governors. I hardly need recall either that the North Korean authorities were given one month to fulfil their obligations. What is not acceptable, is to question the impartiality, the competence, the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency. To question that is to deny the efforts of the international community to base the security of us all on increasing use of multilateral institutions in which the interests of all are represented and reflected, increasing use of multilateral institutions particularly through greater openness to international verification, which is the guarantee of security for all. In other words, what we have here is an attempt to question the will of the overwhelming majority of States to combat proliferation. This is a step backwards which is extremely disquieting. That is what I wished to say. I will simply add two points. The first point which I mentioned last week and which was mentioned by all the speakers on this matter: during the 90 days following notification by North Korea of its withdrawal from the NPT, that country remains bound by its obligations under the Treaty, including fulfilment of obligations

(Mr. Errera, France)

deriving from the safeguards agreement with IAEA. Second point, which I also mentioned last week: any infringement of the regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a blow against the efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament for which the international community is calling.

Mr. GEHR (Austria) (translated from French): Before entering into the substance of the matter, I would not like to neglect to congratulate you, Sir, on behalf of the Austrian delegation, on your election as President, since we have not had an opportunity to do so previously.

We listened with great attention to the statement by Ambassador Ri Tcheul of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We will of course transmit the text to the competent authorities in our capital. Nevertheless, I think this is a good moment in this Conference to recall Austria's position. In February 1992, in this room, at a plenary session, my country welcomed the "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula". At that time we expressed our hope that this declaration would lead to a firm commitment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the NPT. However, that country's intention to withdraw from the Treaty is in our view dangerous and disquieting, for several reasons, particularly for the stability of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, we strongly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respect the commitments which it has entered into towards IAEA and thereby the entire international community. In addition, instead of withdrawing from the Treaty, we urge that country to accept the legitimate decisions of IAEA with regard to it.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. Are there any further delegations who wish to take the floor? I recognize the delegate of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. MOON (Republic of Korea): The position of my delegation was clearly stated at the 646th plenary meeting last week. We pointed out that the North Korean decision to abandon the NPT was a serious challenge to the global non-proliferation system and a threat to regional and global peace and security. We also stressed that the justifications offered by the North Korean authorities for North Korea's act, including the one made by the distinguished Ambassador of the DPRK was and is nothing but a self-serving excuse drawn from a distortion of the actual facts. Today, we note that the international community is united in its disapproval of the North Korean move. This is clear not only in the CD but also in other international forums, including IAEA. The Board of Governors meeting of IAEA held on 18 March adopted a resolution that supports the efforts of the IAEA secretariat to implement the safeguards agreement with the DPRK in an impartial and objective manner and requests the Director General of the IAEA secretariat to report on the response of the DPRK to the special inspection of its suspected facilities at a meeting to be held on 31 March. In this regard I would like to once again urge North Korea to reverse its decision. I sincerely hope that North Korea will act responsibly and fulfil the

expectations of the international community by complying faithfully with the IAEA resolution.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of North Korea for his statement. Are there any further statements to be made? Are there any other delegations who wish to take the floor? I recognize the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Before you take the floor, Sir, and to other delegations as well, I wish to recall that delegations are obviously entitled to express their views on certain issues and my duty as President is to provide you with the chance to do so. It is also clear, however, that once the opportunity has been given, the President shall proceed with the normal business of the Conference. It is also my responsibility to prevent exchanges of views around a particular subject from becoming a political confrontation, which this Conference should not be experiencing as its terms of reference really are of a negotiating character. Several delegations which intervened today also did so at the last plenary and I am not anxious to prolong the debate, so I would encourage our colleague, the Ambassador of the DPRK, to make his statement and keep it brief because he has already given a very extensive outlay of his country's situation. You have the floor.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Mr. President, thank you for giving me the floor once again. In view of the fact that certain distinguished representatives have expressed their concern at the present situation which has arisen because of one super-Power and certain individuals in IAEA, I have many things to explain to them but I will

respect the proposal of the Chair. I would like to avoid confrontation with other delegations and I will desist. I will have other opportunities to explain my position.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement. This concludes our work for today, unless others wish to take the floor.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 25 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.